The eastern industrial zone in Ethiopia : catalyst for development? by Giannecchini, Philip & Taylor, Ian
  
 
 
 
 
The eastern industrial zone in Ethiopia: catalyst for 
development? 
 
Philip Giannecchini and Ian Taylor  
 
 
Date of deposit 06 12 2017 
Document version Author’s accepted manuscript 
Access rights © 2017 Elsevier Ltd.  This work is made available online in 
accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author 
created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and 
may differ slightly from the final published version. 
Citation for 
published version 
Giannecchini, P., and Taylor, I. (2017).  The eastern industrial 
zone in Ethiopia: catalyst for development? Geoforum, 88: pp. 
28-35. 
Link to published 
version 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.11.003 
 
Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research 
Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
1 
 
THE EASTERN INDUSTRIAL ZONE IN ETHIOPIA: CATALYST FOR 
DEVELOPMENT? 
 
In 2000, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Beijing, the Programme 
for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development was launched, in which China 
agreed to share with African countries its experience in the field of investment promotion relating 
to the establishment and management of special economic zones (SEZs). 1  Since then, two 
competitive tenders have led to proposals for the development of seven SEZs in six African 
countries being approved by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), including one in 
Ethiopia: the Eastern Industrial Zone, located in Oromia region around Dukem, a small town some 
35 km south-east of Addis Ababa.2Of the seven proposed zones, Ethiopia’s represents one of the 
biggest challenges to both the Chinese developers and the host government alike.3 Due to its 
geographical location and the absence of any serious SEZ experience in Ethiopia, the zone’s ability 
to contribute to Ethiopia’s economic development remains unclear. Both the Chinese and 
Ethiopian sides however appear very keen for the zone to work: in May 2014, Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang visited the Zone, accompanied by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn.  
Ethiopia in fact is emerging as a veritable hive of economic zones and industrial parks. In 2014 
the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Development Corporation (IPDC) was established. Currently, in 
Ethiopia there are four industrial zones (three of which are foreign-owned): the Eastern Industrial 
Zone; the Lebu Industrial Zone, owned by Huajian Group; Modjo Industrial Zone owned by 
George Shoe and the Bole Lemi Industrial Zone, owned by the Ethiopian state. In 2015, 
                                                          
1 See Ian Taylor The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) London: Routledge, 2011. 
2 The others are located in Algeria (the Algeria-China Jiangling Free Trade Zone); Egypt (the 
China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone); Mauritius (the Mauritius Jinfei 
Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone); two in Nigeria (the Lekki Free Trade Zone, and the 
Ogun/Chinese Free Trade Zone); and Zambia (the Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone in Chambishi, with a Lusaka sub-zone). The zones in Egypt and Zambia are 
already operating (the latter at a low-level capacity). Due to the restructuring of the investment 
policy in Algeria, zone development there has stalled. 
3 It should be added that in addition to the seven official zones, Chinese companies and provincial 
governments have established, on their own initiative, zones in Botswana (China Daheng Textile 
Industrial Park); Guinea (Linyi Industrial Park), Nigeria (Lishi-CSI Industrial Park); and South 
Africa (Shandong Xinguang Textile Industrial Park). Some of these zones (the ones in Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone, for instance) originate from rejected proposals to MOFCOM during the tendering 
rounds.  
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construction began on a $246 million park dubbed Hawassa Industrial Park after the signing of an 
agreement between Addis and China Civil Engineering Corporation (CCECC). Hawassa Industrial 
Park, when finished, is planned to include 35 factory sheds and 19 buildings. The first phase will 
cover 100 hectares, while the remaining phase will add 200 hectares.4 Starting from 2016, IPDC 
will develop additional parks in Mekelle, Dire Dawa, Kombolcha, and probably also Adama. At 
the same time, feasibility studies will be conducted for Bahir Dar in the north-west and Jimma in 
the west. With a final size ranging from 500 to 2000 hectares, each park will be developed in 
phases of 75–200 hectares. 5  Unlike the EIZ, these parks are targeted and coherent vis-à-vis 
industrial focus:  
 
Industrial parks operated or owned by IPDC (Industrial Parks Development Corporation, 2015) 
 Site  Delimited 
land (ha) 
Phase 
I 
Eligible 
industries 
Completion 
period of 
Phase I 
Status 
Addis 
Industry 
Village 
Addis 
Ababa 
8.7 8.7 Apparel 2012 Operational 
Bole Lemi 
I 
Addis 
Ababa 
156 156 Apparel 2014 Operational 
Bole Lemi 
II 
Addis 
Ababa 
186 186 Textiles and 
apparel 
2017 Detail design 
phase 
Kilinto Addis 
Ababa 
337 337 Food 
processing, 
pharmaceuticals, 
furniture, 
household 
appliances, 
2017 Detail design 
phase 
                                                          
4 Government of Ethiopia ‘Ethiopia: Hawassa Industrial Park to Be Constructed’, July 20, 2015. 
5 Industrial Parks Development Corporation, http://www.ipdc.gov.et 
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electronic and 
electrical 
Hawassa South 300 100 Textiles and 
apparel 
2016 Under 
construction 
Dire Dawa East 1500 150 Textiles and 
apparel, vehicles 
assembly, food 
processing 
2016 Under 
construction 
Kombolcha North-
east 
700 50 Textiles and 
apparel, food 
processing 
2016 Open for bids 
Mekelle North 1000 50 Textiles and 
apparel, food 
processing 
2016 Open for bids 
Adama South-
east 
2000 100 Textiles and 
apparel, vehicles 
assembly, food 
processing 
2016 Feasibility study 
phase 
Bahir Dar North-
west 
1000 50 Textiles and 
apparel, food 
processing 
2016/2017 Feasibility study 
phase 
Jimma South-
west 
500 50 Textiles and 
apparel, food 
processing 
2016/2017 Feasibility study 
phase 
 
Constructed at the interface between the top-down and the bottom-up, industrial parks and SEZs 
have very real implications for people living in or near the spaces where they are constructed. 
Concrete studies of the SEZs in action is the most fruitful avenue in lifting the veil of obscurity 
over much of what is really occurring “on the ground” vis-à-vis these projects. This is not least 
because both Beijing and the various host African governments have marketed the “SEZ model” 
as the basis for future deepened collaboration between China and the continent. Indicative of this 
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commitment was a major conference held in Beijing in December 2015 entitled “Industrial Parks 
and Globalization: Experience Sharing between China and Africa”, which sought to discuss best 
practices and past experiences.  The success or otherwise of existing Chinese SEZs in Africa, and 
the processes engendered by the various projects are thus of crucial importance for discussions 
around African development and the role that China may or may not play.6  
This article is based on primary research involving interviews with investors, zone 
developers and operators, regulatory authorities, government officials, and other key stakeholders 
which were conducted in both Beijing and Ethiopia. The study integrates investigations into the 
agenda-setting behaviours of both Ethiopian and Chinese actors involved in the Eastern Industrial 
Zone initiatives, identifying who decides what and with what means, and for whom, for what 
purpose and with what consequences. Analysis of the zones’ potential to have an effect on 
development in Ethiopia, the current obstacles faced and the potential benefits for all the relevant 
stakeholders are outlined. The article takes as its starting point previous accounts of the Eastern 
Industrial Zone,7 as well as a recent study of Ethiopia’s industrial policy, which utilises the theories 
associated with the economist, Albert O. Hirschman.8     
Fundamentally, this article seeks to analyse the progress thus far in the Ethiopian SEZ, to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the project and to determine what impact, if any, the 
development of this zone will have on Ethiopia’s structural transformation. This last point is 
important given that the SEZ scheme is a central component of FOCAC and is heralded as a 
concrete way in which Beijing is exporting its “model” of development to Africa for economic 
change. More concretely, the Ethiopian government has decided that the Eastern Industrial Zone 
(EIZ) is an integral part of its Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) 
                                                          
6 See Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiayang ‘African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones 
in Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49, 1 (2011), pp. 27–54. 
7 Deborah Brautigam and Xiaoyang Tang ‘China’s Investment in Africa’s Special Economic 
Zones’ in Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci (eds.) Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging 
Challenges, and Future Directions Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011; Deborah Brautigam and 
Xiaoyang Tang ‘“Going Global in Groups”: Structural Transformation and China’s Special 
Economic Zones Overseas’, World Development, vol. 63, 2014, pp. 78-91. 
8 Arkebe Oqubay Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015. 
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and the key element in its industrial development ambitions.9 As the article will detail, the zone’s 
contribution to structural transformation of the Ethiopian economy is vital if the zone is to have a 
catalytic effect on sustainable development in Ethiopia. Structural change is here taken as an 
increase in the share of industry or services in the economy, or as the broadening and sophistication 
of exports or as the move of workers from low labour productivity sectors to those with high labour 
productivity.10 
 
Special Economic Zones 
Special Economic Zones can be understood as a blanket term used to describe a variety of 
economic initiatives including, but not limited to, Free Trade Zones (FTZs), Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs), Industrial Zones and Free Ports.11 SEZs are best understood as spatially defined 
geographic areas designed to attract foreign investment by providing economic and commercial 
policies that are more liberal than in the rest of the country, along with infrastructure investment 
designed to facilitate streamlined operations and lower transaction costs for investors. In China’s 
case, “bringing in” (yin jinlai) foreign direct investment, technology and skills was central to the 
SEZ methodology as practiced post-Mao.12  
As a rule, SEZs are long-term orientated, usually taking over a decade to mature, and are 
evolutionary and flexible by nature: as an SEZ develops, its objectives and priorities invariably 
change. A usual evolution is characterised by a shift in focus from attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to technology-upgrading, with a strong focus on encouraging domestic private 
investment. The methods employed to achieve these objectives—including incentives and 
                                                          
9 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program Addis Ababa: Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2002. See also Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010/11-2014/15 Addis 
Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010. 
10  Alice Sindzingre ‘The Ambivalent Impact of Commodities: Structural Change or Status Quo in 
Sub-Saharan Africa?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1, 2013, p. 26. 
11 Susan Tiefenbrun Tax Free Trade Zones of the World and in the United States Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012.  
12 See Gao Shangquan and Chi Fulin New Progress in China’s Special Economic Zones Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1997; Jung-Dong Park The Special Economic Zones of China and Their 
Impact on Its Economic Development Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997; and Douglas Zhihua 
Zheng Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special 
Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2010.  
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policies—are adjusted where and when necessary to meet the changing needs of investors, the host 
government, and the wider context of the global economic environment.13  
Utilised effectively, successes are popularized and up-scaled whilst failures are discarded 
and lessons are learned. In short, as an ideal type, SEZs represent a kind of testing ground, an 
incubator of ideas and policies designed and implemented to take advantage of comparative 
advantages in host economies.14 However, it is not uncommon for SEZs to fail to reach maturity 
or to have the desired catalytic impacts that the SEZ prospectuses promise.15 Studying concrete 
examples of actual SEZs is thus vital if their actual, rather than claimed, efficacy is to be evaluated 
competently. 
In Africa, the first official export processing zones (EPZs) were established in Mauritius 
in 1971.16 Today, over twenty African countries have played host to various industrial clusters, be 
they EPZs, SEZs, FTZs or spatial industrial parks. Problematically—and for reasons that echo 
much of the situation in the Ethiopian SEZ example (see below)—the broad results of SEZs in 
Africa have been uninspiring. Incompletion of the projects, partial functioning and, in some cases, 
termination of the project itself, has been the history of SEZs across the continent. It is for these 
reasons that a preliminary study and assessment of the Ethiopian SEZ is pertinent. 
 
The Eastern Industrial Zone – Overview and Objectives 
The Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia was initially planned in 2007 and launched in 2009 by the 
Ethiopian minister of trade and industry and the Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia. Located in 
Dukem, Oromia state, around 30 kilometres south-east of the capital, Addis Ababa, the original 
plan was to establish a 5km² zone operated by the Yonggang Group and the Qiyuan Group, which 
in five years would entice eighty separate investment projects, creating 20,000 jobs.17 However, 
                                                          
13 Wei Ge Special Economic Zones and the Economic Transition in China Hackensack, NJ: World 
Scientific Publishing, 1999.  
14 Connie Carter and Andrew Harding (eds.) Special Economic Zones in Asian Market Economies 
London: Routledge, 2010.  
15 See Amitendu Palit and Subhomoy Bhattacharjee Special Economic Zones in India: Myths and 
Realities New Delhi: Anthem Press, 2008. 
16 For an excellent overview of the African experience of SEZs, see Thomas Farole Special 
Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global Experiences 
Washington DC: World Bank, 2011.  
17 Brautigam, 2011. 
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the Yonggang Group soon abandoned the project and the zone currently consists of an area of 
2km², a downsizing of over 50%.18Like most other Chinese SEZs in Africa, the Ethiopian zone is 
100% Chinese-owned, developed and operated by the aforementioned Qiyuan Group, a China-
based privately owned steel manufacturer. In addition to the provision of land at an extremely 
favourable rate—one Ethiopian birr (around $0.05) per square meter/per year for 99 years—the 
Ethiopian government has also agreed to provide all the necessary infrastructure outside the zone 
and to cover the cost of 30% of the internal infrastructure.19 This is a remarkable commitment from 
Addis Ababa and hints at the focus within Ethiopia to promote industrialisation.20  The previous 
prime minister, Meles Zenawi, was a strong proponent of industrialisation and looked to the Asian 
late developers for inspiration.21 It was under him that the details of the EIZ were agreed upon and, 
starting under Meles’ leadership, Ethiopia embarked upon a remarkable capital spending 
programme on large investments (around 15 per cent of GDP) in infrastructure projects. Railways, 
roads and dam projects have all been part of this endeavour, as has the industrial parks. This huge 
public investment is credited with driving economic growth above 10 percent. However, the state 
has borne the brunt of raising financing, whilst at the same time requiring that banks invest the 
equivalent of 27 percent of the loan portfolio in low-yield state development bonds. Whilst this 
has been an integral part of the country’s development strategy, the World Bank has criticised 
Addis for reducing the ability of private businesses to borrow.22 
Returning to the EIZ, the focus of the Eastern Zone is difficult to ascertain and contrasts 
with the projects being advanced by the IPDC. The EIZ started out focusing on the production of 
                                                          
18 Interview with Ministry of Industry official, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
19 Interview with Hagos Sequar, Project Promotion Department Manager of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
20  Interview with Dessalegn Rahmato, Researcher and Private Consultant, Addis Ababa, 
September 3, 2013. 
21 See Meles Zenawi African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, unpublished Masters 
dissertation Rotterdam: Erasmus University, no date. Meles argued for an Ethiopian 
developmental state – see Meles Zenawi  ‘States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case 
for a Developmental State’ in Akbar Noman, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein, and Joseph Stiglitz 
(eds.) Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. For a discussion of Meles’ legacy, see Alex de Waal ‘The Theory 
and Practice of Meles Zenawi’, African Affairs, 112 (446), 2013 and René Lefort ‘The Theory and 
Practice of Meles Zenawi: A Response to Alex de Waal’, African Affairs, 112 (448), 2013. 
22 ‘World Bank says Ethiopia Should Diversify Infrastructure Funding’, Reuters (Addis Ababa), 
November 24, 2015. 
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construction materials as well as light industries, including the production of pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, chemicals and leather.23 However, this has now widely diversified. An indicative list 
of companies with a physical location in the zone is below:   
 
                                                          
23 Interview with Chinese manager, Qiyuan Group, Eastern Industrial Zone, February 2011. 
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Name of 
company 
Date entered 
zone 
Investment Physical 
presence 
Industry 
East Cement 
Share Company 
2006 $60 million N/A Cement 
production 
Eastern Hotel  2008 $500,000 3600m² hotel Hotel 
East Cement 
Leasing 
Company 
2008 $5 million Large 
storage/parking 
area 
Construction 
equipment rental 
services 
Zhongshun 
Cement 
Manufacturing 
2008 $11 million 30,750m2 plant Cement 
production 
Chang Cheng 
Packaging 
2010 $510,000 5000m² factory Packaging 
materials 
L & J 
Engineering 
2010 $126,000 2000 m² factory Construction 
cement products 
LQY Pipe 
Manufacturing 
2010 $9 million 5000 m² factory Steel pipes 
Yulong 
Technology 
Building 
Materials 
2010 $420,000 10,000m² 
factory 
Gypsum 
products 
Changfa 
Agricultural 
Equipment  
2011 Unknown Unknown Agricultural 
machinery 
Huajian Group 2011 ‘Several 
millions’24 
Huajian 
International 
Shoe City 
Shoe 
manufacturing 
Unilever Plc 2011 Unknown 5,000 m² 
workshop 
Consumer goods 
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Eastern Steel 2013 $54 million 100,000m² 
factory 
Steel bars and 
wire 
Yangfan Motors 
Plc 
2013 
 
 
$2.8 million 
 
$4.5 million 
(2014) 
 
33,000 m² 
factory 
10,780 m² 
Motor vehicles 
 
 
Ethiopia Great 
Wall Packing 
2014 $2.42 million 8,000 m² factory Packaging 
Be Connected 
Industries 
2015 $2.5 million 7,000 m² factory Garment 
printing  
 
This rather eclectic array of investors is problematic, as will be discussed below.   
Of the companies currently setting up operations in the zone, almost all are Chinese, with 
the exceptions of Unilever and Be Connected, who are  renting facilities (in 2014 Unilever 
announced it was going to start construction of a new factory). According to the zone operators 
and also officials at the Chinese embassy in Ethiopia, until Be Connected made their commitment, 
only one non-Chinese company (from India) had ever expressed any interest in physical 
investment in the zone.25 Ethiopian officials involved in the regulation of the zone claim that 
numerous companies, all Chinese, have signed letters of intent to invest, but how many will 
actually follow through on this commitment remains unclear.26  
 The key motive for Chinese investment in the zone is labour exploitation, relatively cheap 
land and input materials. Against the background of increasing labour costs in China and over-
supply in the domestic manufacturing sector, some Chinese producers find Ethiopia attractive. For 
example, footwear manufacturer Huajian Group, uses the zone to make shoes for the American 
and European markets: 
                                                          
24 Helen Hai, Vice President of Huajian Group, quoted in ‘Huajian plans to generate USD 4 bln 
within a decade’, Bloomberg News, April 2, 2012. 
25 Ibid and interview with Yang Xuhong, Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the 
Chinese embassy, Addis Ababa, January 2011. Confirmed in 2014. 
26 Interview with Hagos Sequar, Project Promotion Department Manager of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
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For Huajian, the major attraction of Ethiopia is its cheap workforce. The average monthly 
payroll for a worker in Ethiopia is about 300 yuan ($50), compared with 3,000 yuan at its 
headquarters in Dongguan, Guangdong province. In addition, because animal husbandry 
output accounts for 20 percent of Ethiopia's gross domestic product, Huajian is using 30 
percent of the local leather yield every year, which saves 30 percent in the cost of raw 
materials…."In general, we can save 18 percent to 28 percent in costs in Ethiopia compared 
with China" [the general manager at Huajian International Shoe City] said.27 
 
An official at the Ethiopian Ministry of Industry openly remarked that: ‘According to our 
evaluation, the Chinese choose Ethiopia because of the stable political situation and the land is 
almost free…Labour is very cheap here too. With 20 birr you can have one day labourer, with 
2000-3000 you can have a professional for a month’.28 
 Incentives to invest in the zone are no different from those offered to any foreign company 
looking to invest in Ethiopia, including tax holidays and waivers on import tariffs for raw materials. 
This includes seven years of income tax holiday for Qiyuan, seven years income tax holiday for 
enterprises in the zone who produce products mainly for the export market and four years income 
tax holiday for enterprises that produce for the local market.29  
The Qiyuan Group has pressed the Ethiopian government to try and arrive at further 
incentives and concessions. Indeed, one of the authors was at the Ethiopian embassy in Beijing 
whilst a delegation from Qiyuan was meeting with the ambassador to discuss issues and to 
‘exchange information’ relating to zone policies and the current incentives on offer.30 According 
to the Qiyuan management in Dukem and officials at the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade, a key issue 
is the ten year 30% value-added tax (VAT) which Qiyuan is obliged to pay. The Ethiopian 
government’s position is that a decrease does not comply with the principles of competiveness. 
Qiyuan have also proposed better incentives and preferential policies to compensate for having to 
                                                          
27 ‘Low Ethiopian Labour Cost Attracts Chinese Investors’, China Daily, December 31, 2013. 
28 Interview with Hagos Sequar, Project Promotion Department Manager of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
29 See Bulti Terfessa ‘Ethiopia’s Trade and Investment Policy’ in Taye Assefa (ed.) Digest of 
Ethiopia’s National Policies, Strategies and Programs Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 
2010. 
30 Interview with Assefa Alemu, Minister Counsellor at the Ethiopian embassy, Beijing, April 
2011. 
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build all the infrastructure inside the zone themselves and point to the past situation in Chinese 
SEZs where, Qiyuan claim, the Chinese government and provincial authorities took care of such 
infrastructure development.31  
However, structural weaknesses in Ethiopia’s infrastructure (now being addressed by the 
state’s huge investments) limit the value of such largesse. Electricity and water shortages are 
endemic to Ethiopia.32 This has at times impeded the smooth development of the zone and has 
even led to a wholesale cessation of construction efforts.33 Moreover, misunderstandings exist over 
whether the pledged 30% from Addis to support the cost of internal infrastructure being built will 
actually be paid. According to reports, officials in Addis agreed to pay when zone construction is 
complete. However, some members of the management at the Qiyuan Group expressed concern 
that this would not be honoured and wanted the costs recovered sooner.34 In response, one official 
at the Ministry of Industry asserted that delivery of the 30% is guaranteed and that the Chinese 
developers should not worry, but instead focus on finishing the construction of the zone and begin 
operations.35 
In an interview with Wu Shuaiju of the management of the zone, problems were enunciated. 
Wu complained that investors cannot obtain title deeds issued by the Government and thus think 
that their property rights are unprotected. This issue about land title deeds has had a knock-on 
effect on investment license applications, duty-free applications, construction permit applications 
and capital loan applications. Qiyuan currently charges enterprises 1.00 ETB (5 cents) per m², the 
same that Qiyuan paid to Oromia State. Additionally, a one-off land development fee is charged 
at about 135 ETB ($6.7) per m². The main bone of contention for Qiyuan was that its investment 
on the zone was considerable and that the current estimate is that it will take more than twenty one 
years to get the investment returned. With an initial development cost of $180 million and an 
                                                          
31 Interview with Hagos Sequar, Project Promotion Department Manager of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
32 See Daniel Mains ‘Blackouts and Progress: Privatization, Infrastructure, and a Developmentalist 
State in Jimma, Ethiopia’, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 27, issue 1, 2012, pp. 3-27. 
33 Interview with Chinese manager, Qiyuan Group, Eastern Industrial Zone, February 2011. This 
is a problem not unique to the Oriental Zone. During field research at the Lekki Free Trade Zone 
in Nigeria, Chinese managers at Lekki Free Trade Zone Company, the zone operators, highlighted 
power shortages as a key problem which they built a power sub-station to address. 
34 Ibid and interview with Chinese manager, Qiyuan Group, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
35 Interview with Ministry of Industry official, Addis Ababa, February 2011. 
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income budget of $7.5 million, it appears that only after twenty four years will Qiyuan start making 
money on the project. 36  Similarly, in an interview with Yin Tianjun, director of Lifan's car 
assembly factory in the zone, Yin complained of high import tariffs, consumption taxes and 
expensive transportation costs. Although labour is much cheaper than in Ethiopia, Yin claimed 
that this was offset by high duties, meaning that the price of a Lifan car is almost triple the price 
found in China.37  
Yet a recent report by World Bank highlighted the fact that financial incentives are not in 
fact correlated with SEZ success. Rather, a strong host business and investment climate is decisive. 
In other words, what is “special” about SEZs is not so much the financial incentives offered to 
investors, but rather the business environment which SEZs provide. Incentives are but just one 
aspect. The resolve of the relevant Ethiopian bodies regarding the incentives issue, therefore, 
should be viewed in a positive light, evidence that the Ethiopian government is less concerned 
with minor issues and perhaps instead focussed on the factors correlated with zone success. In 
contrast, the Chinese side seem fixated on what incentives they can prise out of Addis.  
The Ethiopian government is publicly committed to maintaining macroeconomic stability 
and developing an improved financial sector.38 Regulations have been simplified, customs times 
reduced, and business licenses are substantially cheaper and easier to obtain than before. 39 
Moreover, adhering to the belief that a strong private sector is vital for Ethiopia’s development, 
reforms have been initiated designed to encourage the development of a stronger and more 
competitive private sector.40 The investment code has been amended several times as a means to 
satisfy the ostensible demands of both domestic and foreign investors. 41 The government of 
Ethiopia is not being passive and letting foreign investors do what they want or get what they want 
                                                          
36 Interview with Wu Shuaiju, Eastern Industrial Zone, cited in Ethiopia Herald, January 14, 2015. 
37 Interview with Yin Tianjun, director of Lifan Motors Plc, cited in China Daily, December 31, 
2013. 
38 See Dan Ciuriak and Claudius Preville ‘Ethiopia’s Trade and Investment: Policy Priorities for 
the New Government’, unpublished paper, September 2010. 
39  Asayehgn Desta Ethiopia: From Economic Dependency and Stagnation to Democratic 
Developmental State Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2014.   
40 Admit Zerihun ‘Industrialisation Policy and Industrial Development Strategy of Ethiopia’ in 
Taye Asefa (ed.) Digest of Ethiopia’s National Policies, Strategies and Programs Addis Ababa: 
Forum for Social Studies, 2008, p. 10. 
41 See Solomon Mamo Woldemeskel Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Ethiopia, 
Master’s thesis submitted to Maastricht School of Governance, Maastricht University, 2008. 
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and is proactively defending perceived Ethiopian interests. As one officer at the Ministry of 
Industry tasked with overseeing zone operations explained: ‘We will not budge on the VAT tax 
we are offering the Chinese developer. They [the Qiyuan Group] want us to reduce it, but if they 
think we will do so, they are mistaken’.42 This is perhaps evidence of the Ethiopian government 
exercising its regulatory role and, equally, playing a role as a partner, not a bystander, although it 
should be noted that many African governments are reluctant to concede on VAT..43 
The planning, resolution and execution of the zone initiatives groups together a number of 
agents and stakeholders, such as central governments in Ethiopia and China, local governments in 
Ethiopia, national investment promotion agencies, private businesses, interest groups and local 
communities. Unlike in China, where government agencies generally took the lead in formulating 
and implementing SEZ projects, in Ethiopia, as in the some other MOFCOM-approved African 
zones, private enterprises were at the helm. It was only with the formation of the IPDC that we can 
say that Addis began taking charge. 
The Chinese government (mainly through the embassy in Addis) provide guidance and 
support, but they do not get involved in the business side of the project—this is left to the investor. 
The Qiyuan Group’s relationship to the Chinese embassy in Addis mainly consists of the latter 
helping establish and co-ordinate relations with Chinese companies and parties interested in 
investing in Ethiopia.44 But beyond this, the involvement of the embassy is minimal. This fits with 
previous studies which have found that:  
[T]he Chinese government has taken a ‘hands off’ attitude towards African policies on 
these zones. We could find no evidence or even rumours of conditionalities or quid-pro-
quos imposed on host governments by the Chinese government in return for the 
development of the zones. While the Chinese government played a role at the diplomatic 
level and in visits by Chinese leaders to some (but not all) of the countries hosting zones, 
our interviews make it clear that Chinese companies, with the support of their local 
                                                          
42 Interview with Hagos Sequar, Project Promotion Department Manager of the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
43 Ethiopia has long had a relatively strong and competent state. See Christopher Clapham Haile 
Selassie’s Government New York: Pragaer, 1969; Tsegaye Tegenu The Evolution of Ethiopian 
Absolutism: The Genesis and the Making of the Fiscal Military State (1696-1913) Los Angeles: 
Tsehai Publishers, 2007.  
44 Interview with Yang Xuhong, Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Chinese 
embassy, Addis Ababa, January 2011. 
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embassy, took the lead in negotiations with host governments over particular incentives 
and responsibilities, particularly for infrastructure construction.45 
 
Within Ethiopia, consensus on the EIZ initiative was slow to arrive, particularly the merits or 
otherwise of allowing a private corporation to drive the process. Initially it seemed that the 
Ethiopian government believed that having a private enterprise in charge of the planning, 
implementation and operation of the zone had advantages that state-led initiatives are unable to 
realise. According to one senior official at the Ethio-Chinese Bilateral Commission in Addis 
Ababa, ‘the [Ethiopian] government hopes that the zone developers will be less vulnerable than 
our companies, and that they will be in a better position to access global markets and capital. They 
will also have the know-how which we simply don’t have’.46 Capitalizing on the strengths of 
private enterprises and their experience and knowledge of the global markets alongside their 
operating procedures was one way that the Ethiopian government believes Ethiopian actors 
involved in the zone may benefit and develop. 
However, the formation of the IPDC in 2014 signalled a step up in direction.47 The IPDC 
is fully mandated to develop industrial parks in Ethiopia. As a public enterprise, owned and 
supervised by the government, infrastructure connecting industrial parks with Ethiopia’s core 
infrastructure is also part of the IPDC mandate. This joined-up strategy is indeed noteworthy. The 
IPDC aims to provide a one-stop-shop service for those investing in designated industrial parks in 
collaboration with the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC), the Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority (ERCA) and others. The Ethiopian government’s strategy still acknowledges 
the role of the private sector as an engine in the industrialization process. Within this framework, 
efforts to enhance responsible capitalism is central. By this, the government makes a clear 
distinction between “rent-seeking” and “developmental” capitalists, with the latter obviously being 
favoured. Yet Addis also maintains that the state must play a strong role in development, ‘not 
merely as a facilitator but also as a leader (i.e., providing direct support, co-ordinating and guiding 
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the private sector). Inspired by the East Asian experience the government has recently introduced 
the language of “developmental state” as its policy principle regarding the state-business 
relationship’.48 
 
Catalytic potential? 
A key component of the SEZ paradigm is to move away from the protected and isolated import-
substitution approach of the past towards one ostensibly guided by international competitiveness, 
regional co-operation and a more diversified, private-driven ownership pattern.49 In this sense, the 
SEZs purport to be targeted attempts to stimulate economic growth by creating globally 
competitive spatial entities through new investments, infrastructural development and jobs 
creation.50 Through these initiatives, the host state seeks to “crowd in” private investment in order 
to unlock inherent economic potential in a specific spatial location with unrealised economic 
potential.51 The basic task is to use existing frameworks and/or construct new ones as a means to 
formulate a certain geographic space by which the existing economies can be developed and 
diversified.52 In the study of SEZs this has been termed the ‘catalytic effect’ where there is 
potential for SEZs to engender dynamism in the economy beyond the spatial restrictions of the 
zone and stimulate development.53 Cheesman defines the catalytic effect as ‘interaction with the 
domestic economy: specifically they deal with industrial spillovers and the establishment of zone-
domestic linkages’.54  
For Ethiopian proponents of the zone the aim is clear: to support sustainable industrial 
development, whilst the Chinese equally claim that ‘the purpose of our Eastern Industrial Zone is 
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to make contributions to the economic development of Ethiopia’.55 Of course, Chinese enterprises 
hope to gain competitive advantages in their trading networks (access to new markets and areas of 
unique competitive advantage).  
According to Tadesse Haile, the Ethiopian Minister of Industry, over the next ten to fifteen 
years Ethiopia aspires to evolve from an economy based on agriculture (currently accounting for 
over 40% of national GDP and 85% of national employment) to an industrialised middle-income 
economy. Policy makers in Addis believe that improved living standards, reduction in poverty, 
and greater agency in global affairs will only be achieved once Ethiopia has industrialised. As the 
Ethiopian Minister of Industry Minister has asserted, ‘industrialisation is the benchmark for 
transforming an economy’ helping to foster investment and innovation. 56  
With a low investment capital base in Ethiopia, and a weak local bourgeoisie (which is 
critiqued by the Ethiopian government as being parasitic and dependent on the state 
bureaucracy),57 Addis is looking to foreign investors to act as a vehicle to help speed up the process 
of industrialisation.58 As one official at the Ethio-Chinese Bilateral Commission explained: 
[f]oreign investment is critical to Ethiopia’s development and we must do what we can 
to maximize it to keep our economy on a path of growth. We need to modernise and 
reach international standards. Linking with countries like China who have better 
experience and resources in this regard is vital to Ethiopia’s modernisation efforts.59 
 
The EIZ is held to be capable of acting as a catalyst for innovation and development and inspiring 
the Ethiopian government to plan six new industrial zones around Addis based on the model.60 
 
Untargeted development? 
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The EIZ is, at present, noticeable for it’s rather scattergun approach with regard to the types of 
industries located in the zone. The diversity of industries is problematic given that influential 
development theory argues that a more directed and steered industrial policy is needed in late 
developers, even if this is at the expense of a broad-based strategy. This critique of the EIZ, based 
on the work of Alexander Gershenkron and Albert Hirschman, raises important questions about 
the efficacy of the EIZ as it is currently developing. Indeed, synchronic solutions to the problem 
of industrialization, which the EIZ assumes, is less likely to be effective than sequential solutions. 
Alexander Gerschenkron initially applied the concept of “substitute factors” to the study 
of so-called “latecomer” economies. 61  Rejecting the idea of a one-size-fits-all model of 
industrialisation, Gershenkron recognised the partiality and specificities of development.62 Albert 
Hirschman’s conceptualisation of sequencing followed this line of thought. This was a rejection 
of the dominant idea that required “balanced growth”, whereby the industrial sector is seen as an 
inseparable and amalgamated enterprise, ‘like one huge firm or trust’.63 Instead, Hirschman argued 
that development policies should foster a distortion in profits and investments in accordance with 
a predesigned industrial strategy, as it is these imbalances that facilitate economic growth.64 The 
targeting of sectoral development, rather than attempting a broad-based approach was, according 
to Hirschman, particularly important in resource-poor economies (such as Ethiopia). For example, 
an investment project aimed at an output industry, which at first has to import its equipment and 
inputs, may be planned so that it promotes the production of this machinery and inputs 
domestically, by other companies. This then may help stimulate domestic capital formation and 
backward linkage through the inputs. At the same time, it is also imaginable to set up investment 
projects so that developments in the focussed input industries promote extant output industries, or 
even lead to the materialisation of new output industries i.e. forward linkages.65 The targeted 
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sectors then, ideally, develop into the primary sectors of the economy. Development follows as 
growth in the key sectors spreads to others. Hirschman also postulated two separate processes of 
stimulating an unbalanced growth strategy: investments in basic services that support primary, 
secondary and tertiary production sectors (Social Overhead Capital or SOC) and Directly 
Productive Activities (DPA).66 
Significant investment in SOC will animate investment in DPA by delivering cheap inputs 
to agriculture and industry. For example, low-cost electricity and an efficient power supply 
network may support the development of industries as well as stimulating movement in other 
sectors. As Hirschman notes, ‘Investment in SOC is advocated not because of its direct effect on 
final output, but because it permits and in fact invites DPA to come in some SOC investment as a 
prerequisite of DPA investment’. 67  Imbalances in the economy may also be fashioned by 
investment in DPA such as investment in manufacturing industries and construction. Growth in 
investment in DPA without a matching increase in SOC will likely lead to a rise in production 
costs due to insufficient overhead facilities. If this happens, stresses are likely to develop and the 
state could intervene and embark on investment in SOC to generate the needed infrastructure so 
as to stimulate development of the economy. 
The progression of development from SOC to DPA is referred to as development via excess 
capacity. The second sequence i.e. from DPA to SOC is termed development via shortages. 
Development through an excess of capacity of SOC is less problematic than development via 
deficiencies of SOC: ‘development via shortages is an instance of disorderly compulsive sequence 
while that with excess SOC capacity is essentially permissive’.68 
The concept of unbalanced growth has re-emerged in developmental economics, albeit not 
always overtly. Recent literature ranges from a U-shaped pattern of sectoral diversification during 
the development process to broader industrial policy discussions.69 Indeed, industrial policy is now 
very much back on the agenda of African development. 70  In an important study, Cohen 
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differentiates vertical (sector-specific) and horizontal (framework) industrial policies and it is quite 
clear that Hirschman’s unbalanced growth postulation matches the vertical industrial policy 
classification.71 There have also been attempts to make a distinction between industrial policy “in 
the small” (introducing mechanisms to recognise and eliminate “roadblocks” hindering existing 
economic undertakings) and industrial policies “in the large” (essentially strategic prioritisation 
on favoured industries; the linkage aspect of the unbalanced growth premise offers a standard for 
making policy decisions in this regard.72 
At first glance, the SEZ model appears to follow the logic outlined by Gershenkron and 
Hirschman, given that a spatially concentrated location of economic activity is prioritised (acting 
as substitute factors) over other parts of the economy (unbalanced growth). This has been the case 
with other SEZs.73 Indeed, the EIZ may be seen as nominally functioning as SOC. Yet the EIZ’s 
stated raison d’etre is its embeddedness in Ethiopia’s economy and it is not supposed to be simply 
some enclave assembling products for the external market. Far from it, the EIZ claims to act as a 
catalyst for Ethiopia’s wider industrialisation, which necessitates a strong connection between the 
economy of the EIZ and the local economy. SOC investment in a spatially constrained area with 
minimal backward and forward linkages will not lead to DPA outside of the zone.     
Fundamental to this is that growth needs to be transmitted from one sector to another, with 
robust backward and forward linkages across sectors. Hirschman stressed that backward linkages 
were of greater importance, as sectors with solid backward linkages instinctively generate input 
requirements. However, when one considers the enterprises currently active in the EIZ, the broader 
developmental possibilities appear minimal. Very few have even reasonably durable backward 
linkages, with most being operations with low levels of employment opportunities. It is not good 
enough to argue that the EIZ offers up the possibilities of technology transfers, as the literature 
observes that capacity for transfer spillovers is most pronounced where the differences between 
incoming investment and the local economy is least and that such transfers ‘should be for 
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appropriate sectors and at appropriate levels’.74 A recent study on the effect of Chinese inward 
FDI into Ethiopia confirms that the investment only has a positive spillover effects for Ethiopian 
industry when the technology gap between the Chinese and domestic firms is small, and that 
domestic firms with lower absorptive capacity suffer negative spillover effects from the FDI 
flows.75 Hi-tech investment in an economy like Ethiopia’s is least likely to have beneficial results, 
particularly when the backward linkages are minimal. The catalytic effect potential of the EIZ is 
then probably insignificant 
A problem that is now only be addressed lies in the fact that until recently (2014) the 
government in Addis Ababa took a rather hands-off approach to the EIZ idea. What SOC that was 
occurring wa  to the benefit of the Chinese investors, rather than the wider economy. In China, the 
SEZ model was implemented within a very specific political and economic context, where the 
state was generally able to capably “direct” development through SOC and DPA. This was absent 
in Ethiopia until the IPDC formation, which of course is a positive development. This is 
particularly so given that a study by the World Bank noted that, ‘[c]ountry context is likely to be 
critical in the outcomes of any SEZ program, so it may be implementation rather than policy and 
design that is the most critical factor in determining the success of an SEZ program’.76 Understood 
in this way, it seems that for a SEZ to develop successfully it is a case of not what, but how. As 
the Bank’s report makes clear, this requires the right framework, taking into consideration the host 
country (its comparative market advantage and political economy, including political will) and 
utilising the know-how and experience of the investors and developers. It seems that Addis realised 
this fairly early on in the EIZ experiment as further industrial parks were envisioned. Thus a special 
research unit from the Ministry of Industry in Ethiopia was created and tasked with travelling to 
and investigating different SEZs around the world, identifying what was and what was not 
appropriate to the Ethiopian situation. As the then head of the unit explained to one of the authors: 
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The problem that I see on our side is that we are not ready to support and guide the investors 
so there could be some hindrances when they start investing. Now the government is paying 
attention and we are starting to study the legal framework on how to supervise or how to 
support based on international practice. But we are conscious not to make the mistake that 
other developing countries have made in thinking that we can just copy the exact SEZ model 
of other countries.77The IPDC’s role in such a milieu is likely to be vital.   
 
At a conference held in Ethiopia in 2011 focusing on creating the “right” enabling environment 
for enterprise development, a recurring theme was apparent: China’s development model was right 
for China and whilst certain lessons can be taken from China’s development experience, its 
policies and framework should not be simply replicated in developing countries, but rather serve 
as a point of reference.78 This included China’s success with SEZs. Experimental in nature, SEZ 
strategies were said to actively absorb foreign ideas, but adapt them appropriately to the local 
environment.79 The concrete results of such thinking was the formation of the IPDC, a state 
institution explicitly mandated to offer up a coordinating service for investors considering 
investing in the designated industrial parks (which includes EIZ). Ethiopia has also drafted a new 
Special Economic Zones law ‘based on international best practices’ to guide the governance, 
development and operation of SEZs in the country.80 
Yet despite these potentially positive moves, as well as designing and implementing SEZ 
programmes appropriate to the host country’s economic (and political) context, SEZs must be part 
of a broader and more dynamic national economic development strategy that links SOC with DPA. 
But this need strategizing. Simply crowding in diverse investors from China into a concentrated 
geographic space, with no control over the types and levels of technologies that the investors bring 
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or the depth of linkages that can be developed to the local economy, is unlikely to be optimal. The 
news in October 2015 that a delegation of ten major Chinese pharmaceutical and medical supplies 
companies had visited the EIZ with a view to investing is indicative of this unfocused approach.81 
Whilst the visitors claimed to be interested in partnering with local companies to manufacture 
drugs, the initiative is yet another diversification of industries being collated at the EIZ and again 
undermines its potential as a catalysts for development through a targeted strategy of uneven 
growth. Whilst all potential projects are said to be in the form of joint ventures with Ethiopian 
companies, tying in with the demands of the government’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP 
II), the ability to structurally transform Ethiopia’s economy remains to be seen. 82  What is 
interesting in this regard is that the planned industrial parks operated or owned by the state (under 
the rubric of the IPDC) are far more concentrated and targeted. Further research on these zones 
(most of which are only in the planning or design phase) will clarify whether or not Hirschman’s 
theory of targeting sectoral development, rather than endeavouring a broad-based method (as 
exemplified in the EIZ) is applicable to Ethiopia. 
 
What Chance of Success? 
The potential of the Chinese EIZ to have any meaningful effect on development in Ethiopia is 
uncertain. Firstly, the zone itself has been considerably downsized from the originally planned 
area of eight square kilometres to a mere two square kilometres. Though this was due to the 
developers’ financial problems and the inability to muster enough investors, the fact that the central 
government in Beijing, which has marketed SEZs in Africa as a flagship projects symbolising 
Chinese commitment to “win-win” outcomes and “mutual benefit” did not step in and offer 
assistance is perhaps a sign of its ambivalence towards the initiative beyond the rhetoric. Here it 
should be pointed out that the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) (China’s prime 
investment vehicle in Africa) is not involved. The CADF is involved in three of the seven African 
zones (Lekki in Nigeria, Suez in Egypt, and Mauritius) and has considerable expertise, thus its 
decision not to invest in the Ethiopian zone suggests at the very least that the Fund holds some 
degree of scepticism towards its potential. 
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Interestingly, in contrast to the Ethiopian case, in the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) in 
Nigeria, at the request of the government of the host Lagos State, Beijing did intervene to 
restructure the consortium of Chinese companies involved in the operation of the zone and 
increased the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation’s (CCECC) stake from 25% to 
75%. This can be seen as evidence of the political and commercial importance that the Chinese 
government attaches to the successful development of the LFTZ in Nigeria, and the potential it 
sees in the zone. Also of note, in Nigeria Beijing sent a delegation from MOFCOM to audit the 
accounts of the Lekki Free Trade Zone Company, the 40% Nigerian/60% Chinese joint venture 
created to operate the zone.83 Beijing has also stepped in to solve problems in the Chinese SEZs 
in Mauritius and in Zambia, and former President Hu Jintao attended the opening ceremony of the 
Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. In contrast, there has been no intervention 
by the Chinese government in Ethiopia, even after the Qiyuan Group, with no previous experience 
in developing a SEZ, continued to develop the zone after initial partners pulled out.  
Currently, policymakers and government officials alike seem to regard the SEZ as little  
more than a fancy industrial zone, created to facilitate foreign (i.e. Chinese) investments focused 
on light industries. As Arkebe Oqubay, a senior adviser to Ethiopia's prime minister, recently noted, 
too many SEZs in Africa are underwritten by outsiders and are ‘a kind of fad that is seen as a 
solution for everything’ despite the fcat that it is obvious that such industrial parks cannot be ‘a 
replacement for the basics’. 84  What is remarkable about this situation is that it once again 
replicates the weaknesses that characterised previous attempts in Africa to set up industry clusters: 
poor infrastructure, fragile ties to sources of innovation and technology, and a broad absence of 
state support.85 Inappropriate technology levels and the absence of beneficial linkages to the 
domestic economy might also be added to this set of problems. Whilst Addis Ababa talks loudly 
about industrialisation and developing Ethiopia, it is in fact the Chinese investors that have put up 
the bulk of the capital and shouldering the majority of the risks involved. Time will tell whether 
the IPDC’s industrial parks will be qualitatively better. However, at least it may answer some of 
Eshetu Chole’s warnings:  
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[W]here industrialisation has been successfully implemented, it was under the leadership 
of an indigenous capitalist class or a strong state. In the absence of such a class in the Third 
World, ownership and leadership of industry has fallen in the hands of foreign 
entrepreneurs or those of the state, or some combination of these. Where foreign enterprise 
has the upper hand, whatever industrialisation takes place is likely to be dependent, that is 
without any organic domestic base, and therefore fragile.86  
 
Conclusion 
The most important implication of this study is that policymakers must understand and engage 
with the interaction among and between industrial structures, linkage potentials, and the political 
economy of a given situation. Host governments where SEZs have been successful have taken 
advantage of the dynamic potential of the zones as an instrument of sustainable structural 
economic transformation. This currently does not yet exist in Ethiopia. Indeed:  
Weak information flows, risk aversion, and a poor environment for investment protection 
and contract enforcement in Ethiopia combine to foster entrepreneurial conservatism. The 
result is personalised business relations, exceptionally low productivity, and the pursuit of 
opportunistic rents in often dysfunctional markets. These factors have allowed efficient and 
inefficient businesses to continue to coexist, leaving domestic business vulnerable to 
international competition as sectors are opened.87  
 
The fact that the Eastern Zone is operated by a wholly owned Chinese venture and that no 
Ethiopian businesses are investing in the zone means instead that significant levels of technology 
and knowledge transfer are highly unlikely to take place. 88  Nor are backward linkages, as 
Hirschman identifies so clearly, likely to be of any significance. While the EIZ developers claim 
that they are very willing to work with local companies in Ethiopia and that they actively encourage 
Ethiopians to invest in the zone, in practical terms, capital investment required to obtain a stake in 
the zone prevents this from happening. This then has led some Ethiopians to believe that rather 
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than being an initiative aimed at assisting Ethiopia’s industrialisation, the Eastern Industrial Zone 
is in fact designed to facilitate the expansion and penetration of Chinese private enterprises into 
Africa, and that the former (industrialisation) may be just an incidental offshoot of the latter, at 
best.89 Such an analysis would confirm Andrew Shrank’s general prognosis on such economic 
zones.90  
Yet the decision announced by Addis that it was going to invest $1.3 billion for industrial 
parks, with $700-750 million coming from sovereign bonds issued by the state reflects an 
expression of faith in the workability of these spatially concentrated industrial nodes.91 Whilst the 
IPDC has (understandably for political reasons) sought to spread the geographic range of these 
planned parks a problem immediately arises: all previous experiences of economic zones 
demonstrates the need to prioritise development based on site selection criteria so as to make sure 
that the different zones do not end up competing with each other. That there is sufficient demand 
to fill all proposed sites is another basic principle and it is unclear where the Ethiopian government 
believes it is going to get the necessary investors for their expansive programme given Ethiopia’s 
infant private sector, underdeveloped transport facilities and unpredictable infrastructure and 
utilities. If the hope is that foreign investors will fill the gap, the question of dependent 
development comes to the fore. This is something that the state in Ethiopia will have to carefully 
manage. 
 Remaining with the EIZ, if local companies cannot afford to invest in the zone, and it is 
not financially feasible for the bigger companies to shift operations from their current location into 
the zone (which in itself is somewhat geographically remote), then the Eastern Zone will be of 
possible limited benefit to Ethiopia. Technology and knowledge transfer or spill-over, a 
fundamental aspect of any claimed SEZ model, will not occur if Ethiopians are unable to access 
the opportunities in the zone. Evidence suggests that, at best, Ethiopian involvement in the zone 
will be limited to providing cheap labour and the supply of some basic low-grade input materials 
(primarily in the shoe factory). Thus the assertion that Ethiopia ‘could become the China of Africa’ 
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in terms of industrialisation is unlikely.92 What is more likely is that the ‘China of Africa’ element 
will consist of very low wage levels, enabling profit maximisation for the investors. The EIZ then 
will not perform its task as a substitute factor in spurring development or stimulating significant 
DPA.  This contradicts previous studies such as by Brautigam and Tang, but is in line with the 
conclusions drawn by studies of Ethiopia’s industrial policies by Ethiopian academics and others.93 
For instance, the World Bank’s latest report on the state of Ethiopia’s economy is less bullish about 
the industrial zones (IPs) performance in the country: 
The inexistence of IP-related policies and management experience led to multiple 
challenges in planning and implementing of the EIZ and Bole Lemi 1 industrial parks. A 
range of issues have held back the performance of the program, including…lack of an 
effective and functioning policy, regulatory and institutional framework; weak strategic 
planning and demand-driven approach; poor on-and-off site infrastructure planning; lack 
of specific on-and-off-site costing, performance agreements, and economic and financial 
analysis; absence of institutional capacity to oversee IP development; inefficient 
procedures and controls, including customs administration; lack of systematic investment 
promotion to attract committed anchor investors; and deficiencies in designing and 
implementing a linkages program, a communications and outreach strategy, and 
establishing and tracking performance indicators. These factors, combined with a poor 
business environment and weak eco-system related to skills and technology, have not led 
to the envisaged outcomes.94  
 
From interviews with people living around the zone in Dukem and in Addis Ababa, concerns were 
common around the questions of how the EIZ would translate into employment opportunities and 
how might this then facilitate a better quality of life. At the moment, employment generation is the 
main (if not sole) benefit of the Eastern Zone for the local population. This will likely stay the 
same for years to come as the zone develops and matures from the preliminary developmental 
                                                          
92 ‘Ethiopia Becomes China’s China in Search for Cheap Labor’, Bloomberg News, July 22, 2014 
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93 See Arkebe Oqubay, 2015. 
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stage and early operational stages.95  Officials in Addis hope that when experience levels in 
Ethiopia increase, particularly in the management and understanding of the zone operations, then 
the more dynamic benefits for Ethiopians will accrue as they begin to take charge of the 
management of zone operations and become responsible for its continued growth and 
development.96 But this ambition remains vague and in any case is unlikely to generate substantial 
employment opportunities with a high skills transfer content. The bulk of the workforce in the EIZ 
will remain low-skilled, low-paid. 
 The government in Addis Ababa is strongly focussed on attracting FDI.97 Such policies are, 
in the absence of lucrative and easily exploitable resources, reliant on an investment climate where 
investors feel secure.98 Given that infrastructure (or lack thereof) is one of Ethiopia’s main barriers 
to attracting significant foreign investment, the SEZ may provide one way to address this issue, 
albeit necessarily confined to a small locale. However—and this goes to the heart of the viability 
of the SEZ in Ethiopia—even having world-class infrastructure (SOC) within the gates of a SEZ 
loses any advantages if the infrastructure outside the zone is poor (as it generally is in Ethiopia) 
and linkages to the local economy are minimal. This is why the government’s huge investment in 
Ethiopia’s infrastructure is so important.  
 Currently the Eastern Industrial Zone is in the early stages of development and it could be 
argued that evaluations such as ours are premature. On the positive side, it could be suggested that 
for the Ethiopian government a number of short term objectives have already been achieved, most 
notably attracting foreign (even if mainly only Chinese) investment and the institutional 
development of an improved investment climate. The establishment of the IPDC, which has clearly 
been influenced by the Chinese SEZ experience as well as ambitions to construct a developmental 
state in Ethiopia can alos be seen to be positive.  It was certainly a coup on the part of Ethiopia to 
be chosen by Beijing to host one of the Chinese SEZs in Africa.  
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 As the zone develops analysts will need to study to what extent does this zone in Ethiopia 
act as a substitute factor for DPA and development and how deep are its linkages to the Ethiopian 
economy, as well as to what extent does the zone provide easily accessible opportunities for the 
domestic business community and the local population? This will likely be the focus of future 
research on the Chinese SEZs in Africa, allowing the identification of whether or not the SEZ 
framework is appropriate and effective in the African context, and whether or not host countries 
are best utilising the dynamic catalytic potential of SEZs to generate long-term sustainable 
development. The ability of the state-owned industrial parks will be similarly evaluated.  
Future analyses will necessarily take place within the context whereby the new SEZs and 
industrial parks will ‘face the challenge that many similar attempts to construct special zones in 
African countries have failed’.99 As an integral aspect of China’s formal Africa policies, the SEZs 
will be central to any evaluation of the claimed “win-win” relationship that is so prominent in 
official Chinese discourse vis-à-vis its ties with the continent.100 Equally, they will be no doubt 
useful indicators of Ethiopia’s developmental progress  
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